PC Self-Censorship at the American Foreign Policy Council by Srdja Trifkovic

http://www.jihadwatch.org/2011/04/trifkovic-pc-self-censorship-at-the-american-foreign-policy-council.html

PC Self-Censorship at the American Foreign Policy Council
by Srdja Trifkovic

The decision by Comedy Central, the television channel owned by MTV Networks, to
censor an episode of “South Park” that alluded unflatteringly to Muhammad, and
the terrifying case of Molly Norris, a cartoonist forced into hiding here in the
United States for “insulting the Prophet,” are but two recent examples of how
successfully the Muslims have instilled terror into the hearts of American
unbelievers (as commanded by the Koran, 8:12). In Europe the situation is even
worse, of course, and ranges from the ritual slaughter of Theo van Gogh in
Holland and the terrorizing of the Muhammad cartoonist in Denmark to the sorry
spectacle of kowtowing to Muslim demands everywhere.
The bacillus of deferring to the sensibilities of Islamist “activists” and their
Western abettors has started infecting even those who purport to inform the
world about “the nature of the contemporary Islamist threat around the world and
on the current activities of radical Islamist movements worldwide.” It is in
sorrow rather than anger that I am compelled to present the facts of a recent
example.
In early February I was approached by the American Foreign Policy Council to
write a 4-5,000 word entry on Bosnia for their World Almanac of Islamism –
self-described as “a comprehensive resource designed to track the rise or
decline of radical Islam on a national, regional and global level.“
The article was to be divided into four sections covering some key aspects of
the problem. The honorarium offered was a symbolic $500 for a task of this
magnitude. I nevertheless accepted because I believed the endeavor eminently
worthy of support and the institution behind it reliable to see it through
professionally and objectively. I saw the project as a long overdue antidote to
John Esposito’s mendacious Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. I wrote the
article (attached at the end) and sent it to the AFPC on April 11.
On the morning of April 12 they called me to say that the editorial board had
several concerns about certain turns of phrase and my treatment of some specific
points, and indicating that they would be sending me a list of suggested edits
shortly. I told them that I would deal with the matter as soon as I get the
file. A few hours later, however, they called me to inform me that the Board had
just decided not to publish the article at all. No satisfactory explanation was
offered.
The cat was soon out of the bag, however; Washington is a small place. On April
14 I learned from two different yet equally reliable sources close to the
institution in question that the problem was not with the article but with me.
One person on their team had done some background research on me and presented
the board with two supposedly incriminating quotes which were deemed so
outlandish that they disqualified me as an acceptable author of the Chapter:
1. “Islam is inherently aggressive, racist, violent, and intolerant.”
2. “Islam has been for the past thousand years a gigantic grinder that turns its
adherents into intellectual and moral cripples.”
Some rhetorical flourish of the second quote apart, the substance of both
statements is elementary to anyone seeking to educate the public about the
nature of the threat. If they make their author unpublishable, by the same token
many names infinitely more prominent than mine are presumably verboten at the
AFPC. De Tocqueville is beyond the pale for writing, “I studied the Koran a
great deal. I came away from that study with the conviction there have been few
religions in the world as deadly to men as that of Muhammad.” Or Winston
Churchill for exclaiming, “How dreadful are the curses which Mohammedanism lays
on its votaries! Besides the fanatical frenzy, which is as dangerous in a man as
hydrophobia in a dog, there is this fearful fatalistic apathy… No stronger
retrograde force exists in the world.” Or Bernard Lewis for stating that
“unbelievers, slaves, and women are considered fundamentally inferior to other
groups of people under Islamic law.”
In subsequent contacts initiated by the AFPC and ostensibly aimed at finding a
mutually acceptable solution to the issue my various suggestions were rejected.
On a peripheral note, particularly galling was their offer to pay me the $500
even though the article was not published. It merely added insult to injury.
This whole affair is a paradigmatic case of dhimmitudinal self-censorship at its
worst. Its implications are dire and eminently predictable.

The unpublished chapter on “Bosnia” submitted to The World Almanac of Islamism

BRIEF OVERVIEW – Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter B-H) was an Ottoman province
from the time of the Muslim conquest in 1463 until the Austrian-Hungarian
occupation in 1878. During this period a large segment of its indigenous Slavic
population was converted to the faith of their Turkish conquerors, often under
duress, thus creating the westernmost outpost of Islam in Europe. In 1918 B-H
was incorporated into the newly created Yugoslav state following World War I and
became one of Communist Yugoslavia’s six constituent republics after World War
II.
The defining feature of B-H is the fact that it is not a nation-state but a
microcosm of the former Yugoslav federation itself. According to current
estimates the Muslims (“Bosniaks”) account for 48 percent of its 4m people,
(Eastern Orthodox) Serbs for 37 percent, and (Roman Catholic) Croats for 14
percent.[i] These three constituent nations co-exist in a single state but do
not share the sense of common nationhood. Throughout its modern history B-H has
been an “ethnified” society and polity. Most Muslims support the model of an
unitary state in which they would dominate by virtue of their plurality, while
the Serbs and Croats overwhelmingly owe their primary allegiance to their
respective national communities in the neighboring kin-states.
The Islamist revival and activity in B-H is the direct consequence of the
three-sided war (1992-1995), the most violent segment of a series of conflicts
that started when the Yugoslav Federation unravelled 1991. It chief cause was
the determination of Alija Izetbegovic, the late leader of the Muslim community,
that Bosnia should declare independence regardless of the will of other
constituent nations, and regardless of risks associated with such approach. A
year before the war started he declared, “I would sacrifice peace for a
sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would
not sacrifice sovereignty.”
The ensuing conflict was a paradigmatic case of a “fault-line war” between Islam
and non-Islam.[ii] The paradigm was defined two decades earlier by Izetbegoviæ
in his Islamic Declaration (1970). In this programatic tract he denied the
possibility of “peace or coexistence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic
societies and political institutions” and exalted the “natural function of the
Islamic order to gather all Muslim communities throughout the world into
one.”[iii] He also asserted that “the Islamic movement should and can, take over
political power as soon as it is morally and numerically so strong that it can
not only overturn the existing non-Islamic power, but also build up a new
Islamic one.”
Izetbegovic’s views were unremarkable from a traditional Islamic point of view:
the final goal is Dar al Islam, where Muslims dominate and infidels submit. They
were nevertheless deeply destablilizing in the Bosnian context. Of the three
ethnic-religious parties in B-H, Izetbegovic’s Muslim party—the SDA—was the most
radical by far, in that it alone advocated a fundamental restructuring of the
Bosnian society in accordance with a supposedly divine revelation. It attempted
to do so not on Bosnia’s own terms nor within its local paradigm, but within the
terms of the global-historical process of the global Islamic renaissance.
Izetbegovic’s current successors in the Bosnian-Muslim political leadership in
Sarajevo, headed by his son Bakir, have not given up that goal.
A key obstacle to the Islamists’ long-term aspirations exists in the form of
B-H’s complex constitutional arrangements codified in the Dayton Accords
(November 1995) which formally ended the war. The Accords, mediated by the late
Richard Holbrooke, were a compromise between the Muslim demand for B-H sovereign
statehood and the striving for self-rule by the other two communities. Combining
federal and confederal elements, B-H now has a weak central government, based in
Sarajevo, and two self-governing “entities”: the Republika Srpska (“Serb
Republic,” 49% of B-H territory), the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina of equal size, and a small shared district in the northern town of
Brèko. The elaborate ethnic power-sharing arrangements have the twin objectives
of preventing the imposition of a centralist, unitary state by the Muslims, and
preventing the secession of the Serbs and Croats.
Some Western advocates of B-H’s unitarization have argued that a significant
strengthening of the central government is necessary to overcome the legacy of
ethnic divisions, to make the state more “multiethnic” and “multicultural.” This
view of Bosnia as a potentially harmonious melting pot ignores the historical
experience and the current Islamist agenda of the Muslim leadership. It also
begs an old dilemma: If Yugoslavia collapsed under the weight of differences
among its constituent nations, how can Bosnia-Herzegovina develop and sustain
the dynamics of a viable polity, let alone that of an unitary post-ethnic state?
Richard Holbrooke provided the answer when he insisted that B-H is, and has to
be, structured as a federal state: “You cannot have a unitary government,
because then the country would go back into fighting. That’s the reason that the
Dayton agreement has been probably the most successful peace agreement in the
world in the last generation, because it recognized the reality.”
B-H’s future viability and stability in general, and resistance to Islamism in
particular, depend on the continued acceptance of that reality by the
international community.

ISLAMIST ACTIVITY – Not unlike Islamist parties elsewhere—notably the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey—the leading Bosnian Muslim
political party, the SDA, has had since its founding a public, “secular” front,
and an inner core of Islamic cadres that made all key decisions. Accordingly, as
the Bosnian crisis exploded in 1992 the SDA leadership claimed for foreign
consumption that it wanted to establish a multiethnic, liberal, democratic
society; “but President Izetbegovic and his cabal [harbored] much different
private intentions and goals.”[iv] The Western media nevertheless proved eager –
from an early stage of the war – to accept an idealized image of “Bosnia” as the
Muslim side misrepresented it. With an appalling irony, the Muslims became
identified with the victims, the Serbs with the Nazis.[v] “Saving” the Muslims
would expiate for not saving the Jews of Warsaw or Riga fifty years earlier.
On the other hand, within months of the war breaking out, Izetbegovic authorized
the establishment of the El Moujahed brigade of the Bosnian-Muslim army (AbiH),
composed of volunteers from all over the Islamic world. The unit was
distinguished by its spectacular cruelty to Christians, including decapitation
of prisoners to the chants of Allahu-akbar.[vi] El Moujahed was the nursery from
which an international terrorist network spread to Europe and North America. As
the 9/11 Commission Report notes, terror mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
along with three of the hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al
Mihdhar), all fought in the Bosnian jihad.
The U.S. Administration of President Bill Clinton was effectively an ally of the
Muslim side in the Bosnian war, mistakenly hoping to improve its standing in the
Muslim world as a whole by helping Izetbegovic. In 1996 the U.S. House Committee
on International Relations launched an investigation into America’s role in
Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. Their investigation found that the
Iranian government had provided a full two-thirds of the Bosnian-Muslims’
military hardware. According to their report,[vii]
Iran ordered senior members of its Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”),
the elite force used to advance militant Islam, to travel to Bosnia to survey
the military needs of the government. IRGC trainers taught the Muslims how to
use anti-tank missiles and helped with troop logistics and weapons factories.
The IRGC also incorporated religious indoctrination into military training. Iran
used this leverage to urge Hizballah to send foreign fighters to the region as
members of the Mujahideen. The effort was successful, and a force of thousands
drawn from several pro-Iranian groups and other Islamic Opposition movements
assembled in Bosnia.
After the end of the Bosnian war, many foreign Jihadist volunteers
remained.[viii] The Bosnian-Muslim government circumvented the Dayton rules by
granting the Mujahideen citizenship. Within months after the war’s end they were
well established, having taken over Serbian-owned properties and married local
women.[ix] They included members of well-known terrorist organizations, such as
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA), Hamas and al-Qaida. The
new civitzens and other Bosnian veterans went on to perpetrate murder and mayhem
all over the world. President Clinton was still in the White House when a
classified State Department report warned that the Muslim-controlled parts of
Bosnia had morphed
into a base for Islamic terrorism.[x] It noted that hundreds of foreign
mujaheddin who had become Bosnian citizens presented a major terrorist threat to
Europe and the United States. Among them were hard-core terrorists, some with
ties to bin Laden, but protected by the Bosnian-Muslim government. A
confirmation came in November 2001 when two Bosnian passports were found in a
house vacated in Kabul by the fleeing Taliban.[xi] The findings were summarized
by a former State Department official: Bosnia had become “a staging area and
safe haven” for terrorists.
An early sign came in March 1996. On the eve of a G-7 summit in Lille the French
police discovered a plot to attack the Western leaders by a group of Muslims at
nearby Roubaix who had fought in the Balkans. All of their weapons and
explosives were smuggled from Bosnia. The French thus uncovered what they called
“the Bosnian Connection.”[xii] They also established that Osama Bin Laden’s
links to the Bosnian Muslims were known to the Clinton Administration, and
quietly tolerated by Washington.[xiii]
The following year, the Bosnian Connection resurfaced following the bombing of
the Al Khobar building in Riyadh: several suspects had served with the Bosnian
Muslim forces and were linked to Osama Bin Laden.[xiv] Abdelkader Mokhtari, an
Algerian but also a Bosnian citizen, tried to help smuggle C-4 plastic
explosives and blasting caps to a group plotting to destroy U.S. military
installations in Germany.[xv] More notably, even the 9/11 attacks had a Bosnian
Connection:
Khalid Sheikh Muhammad – the infamous KSM, the senior al-Qaida operative who
planned the 9/11 attacks – was a seasoned veteran of the Bosnian jihad, as were
two of the hijackers. It should be noted that the Millennium Plot at the end of
December 1999, the narrowly averted al-Qaida attempt to blow up Los Angeles
International Airport, was planned by a cell of mujahedeen operating in
Montreal, most of them veterans of the Bosnian war, and the operation was
controlled out of central Bosnia.[xvi]
Yossef Bodansky, director of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional
Warfare of the US Congress, has warned for years that Islamist terrorist network
were thriving with the tacit connivance of the authorities in the
Muslim-controlled regions. Bodansky specifically linked the central Zenica
region north of Sarajevo with a series of suicide attacks in Baghdad in August
2003, including the bombing of the UN headquarters which killed 22 people. The
cells were using Bosnia as a training ground and a gateway to send terrorists to
Western Europe or to hide them on their way to the east if they were on the run.
The local Bosnian-Muslim authorities, well aware of this, decided not to
act.[xvii] In fact, some terrorists for whom arrest warrants had been issued in
the West go back to Bosnia where local liaison officers welcome them, provide
accommodation and refuge until they are moved on to new assignments.[xviii] The
method of financing, unsurprisingly, rests on a network of a host of
Saudi-finances “charities,” compromised by terrorist links and under pressure
elsewhere, but still active in the Balkans. Prominent among them was the Vazir
in the Bosnian city of Travnik, the local offshoot of the Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation, placed on the U.N. list of terrorist suspects in March 2002, whose
officers were indicted in the United States in February 2005.[xix]
A significant contemporary factor of Islamic radicalization in Bosnia is the
growth of Wahabbism. Local security experts indicate that there are over 3,000
potentially dangerous individuals who follow the fundamentalist Salafite Islamic
movement. One of their centers, at the northern Bosnian village of Gornja Maoca,
was raided by 600 police officers in February 2010, but with slender results:
the activists appear to have been warned by the Muslims in the Bosnian security
apparatus of the pending action. In fact, the connivance of sympathetic local
Muslims at different levels of officialdom has been and still remains the key
obstacle to denying various Islamist extremists a foothold in B-H.

ISLAMISM AND SOCIETY – Understanding the complexities of contemporary Bosnia is
not possible without some reference to the vastly different experience of the
Ottoman Empire among its Muslims and non-Muslims. The denial of Turkey’s ongoing
re-Islamization goes hand in hand with an ongoing attempt by some Western
authors to rehabilitate the Ottoman Empire and to present it as almost a
precursor of Europe’s contemporary multicultural tolerance and diversity.
Four salient features of Bosnia under the Ottoman rule were institutionalized
discrimination of non-Muslims, personal insecurity of all its subjects but
primarily Christians, an unfriendly coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims, and
the absence of unifying state ideology. It was a Hobbesian borderland with
mosques. The Christians were subsequently subjected to the practice of
devshirme. The annual “blood levy” of Christian boys in peacetime was a novelty
even by the Arabian standards. This, the most hated of all taxes, necessitated
deliberate mutilation of many healthy Christian boys by their parents to render
them safe from capture. The practice has left a deep scar on the collective
memory of the Bosnian Serbs. It has contributed to their thorough loathing of
all aspects of the Ottoman legacy that persists to this day.
For as long as the Ottoman domain expanded, bringing new slaves and fresh tax
revenue into the system, it could maintain the pretense of imperial glamor.
After the death of Suleyman “the Magnificent” that expansion was finally checked
and the decline started almost immediately. To survive the non-Muslims had to
learn how to be obsequious to their masters and insincere with outsiders. At the
same time the status of most non-Muslims, nominally regulated through the Millet
system of self-governance, continued deteriorating with the decline of the
Empire.
The local ruling elite in Bosnia was composed of the descendants of local
converts to Islam. Their behavior, remarkably reminiscent of the strident
antisemitism of some former Jews (such as Karl Marx), displayed a suppressed
guilty grudge against their former co-religionists. In the 18th and 19th
centuries the local Muslims asserted their rebellious independence vis-à-vis the
Porte. This process was accompanied by far harsher treatment of the despised
Christian rayyah than was either mandated or normally practiced from the
Bosphorus. Avoiding the blood levy and improving one’s overall material and
social position were important factors affecting the decision to convert to
Islam. This contributed to the new stratification of the Bosnian society under
Ottoman rule, and created a new power balance among groups. The balance shifted
drastically in favor of the converts. The emergence of a significant number of
Islamized Slavs holding high posts in the Ottoman administration deepened the
rift. Local Muslims, of the same blood and language as their subjects, started
appearing as officials and tax collectors, often more brutal and arrogant than
their Turkish predecessors. Bosnia’s Muslims and non-Muslims, of the same stock
but divided first by faith and then increasingly by culture, gradually became
members of two deeply opposed social and political groups.
The converts’ readiness to come to terms with the conquerors gave them an upper
hand. This was the beginning of a tragic division, of separate roads for
Bosnia’s Muslims and Christians. The former became the rulers and the latter the
ruled. In the 14th and 15th centuries the great majority of “Bosnians” were
Christians, Orthodox or Roman Catholic in the north and west, predominately
Orthodox in the south and east. The phenomenon of Islamization, and all that it
meant in terms of personal welfare and social advancement, thus became the
defining foundation of Bosnia’s politics and society. The religious gap became
the defining trait of subsequent ethnic identities. It fully shaped the
inter-communal relations in the age of nationalism in the 19th and 20th
centuries. The social realities reflected at the level of religious affiliations
were given contemporary political articulation in the writings and work of Alija
Izetbegovic.

ISLAMISM AND THE STATE – Izetbegoviæ stepped down in 2000 and died three years
later, but his son Bakir, who leads the SDA party, is an Islamist hard-liner par
excellence. His followers have internalized his father’s teaching and vision.
They are active at all levels of Bosnia’s Muslim nomenklatura. As Jane’s
Intelligence Review concluded in 2006, “The current threat of terrorism in
Bosnia and Herzegovina comes from a younger, post-war generation of militant
Islamists, radicalized by US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.” This post-war
generation has put on suits and ties, learned English, and perfected the art of
taqiyya to a high degree.
The strengthening of the Islamist paradigm within the Bosnian-Muslim political
and social elite centered in Sarajevo was not a temporary byproduct of the war,
but its lasting result. Eight years after Dayton, Bosnia was described as “a
hotbed of extremists ready to…carry the fight of the Islamic terror syndicates
against the ‘godless West’ to the southeast of Europe” by Germany’s intelligence
chief August Hanning.[xx] His concern was shared by the former commander of the
NATO stabilization force in Bosnia (SFOR), Brig.Gen. Steven Schook, whose troops
had monitored Islamist militants who fought alongside local Muslims. He
described as one of his main tasks to prevent the ability of a terrorist
organisation to thrive in Bosnia.[xxi]
The task has been and still remains beyond the outsiders’ powers, however,
because of the nature of Sarajevo’s political establishment. Far from being
“pro-Western,” it is a key element in Turkey’s current policy of neo-Ottomanism.
Iran is also a major influence in Bosnia. It had already obtained a foothold of
its own when the Clinton Administration got Teheran’s help in supplying the
Muslim army with weapons.[xxii] This was done in violation of the UN arms
embargo initially demanded by the U.S. and behind the back of its European
allies.[xxiii] The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were not told at
first.[xxiv] Iranian intelligence operatives came with the weapons. The result
was a symbiotic relationship between the ruling Muslim establishment in Sarajevo
and the Tehran regime. While meeting Sarajevo’s representatives, to take but one
example, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said that “the Jihad of the the Bosnian and
Palestinian nations is praiseworthy and a source of honor for Muslims” and that
“the resistance and faith of these nations will be registered in the history of
Islam.”[xxv]
The Bosnian war was still raging when the late Sir Alfred Sherman, one-time
advisor to Prime Ministers David Ben Gurion of Israel and Margaret Thatcher of
Britain, warned that the Muslims’ objective was to create a ‘Green Corridor’ in
the heart of the Balkans, and that by supporting the Muslim side the West was
“in effect fostering this Islamistan.”[xxvi] Sherman’s prescient diagnosis is
confirmed by Col. Shaul Shay, an expert on Islam at BESA Center at Bar-Ilan
University. Shay notes that “the Balkans serve as a forefront on European soil
for Islamic terror organizations, which exploit this area to promote their
activities in Western Europe, and other focal points worldwide.” His conclusions
are startling:
[T]he establishment of an independent Islamic territory including Bosnia, Kosovo
and Albania along the Adriatic Coast, is one of the most prominent achievements
of Islam since the siege of Vienna in 1683. Islamic penetration into Europe
through the Balkans is one of the main achievements of Islam in the twentieth
century.[xxvii]
John R. Schindler, professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and
former National Security Agency analyst, is another expert who insists that
Bosnia provides the missing piece in the puzzle of al-Qa’ida’s transformation
from an isolated fighting force into a lethal global threat.[xxviii] Like
Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia in the 1990s became a training ground for the
mujahidin, Schindler argues, leading to a blowback of epic proportions.
Sixteen years after the Bosnian war ended at Dayton, it remains misrepresented
by the Western mainstream media. The American public is still unaware that
hard-core Islamists have used Bosnia as a base for terrorist operations
worldwide, including attacks on the United States from the Millennium Plot to
9/11, and that multinational veterans of the Bosnian jihad have conducted
terrorist attacks around the world. This would not have been possible if the
Clinton administration, in collaboration with Iran, had not secretly supplied
Bosnia’s mujahidin with millions of dollars of weapons.[xxix]
The result of Clinton’s Balkan policy is the establishment of a vibrant,
resilient jihadist base in the Balkans.[xxx] The collusion between Muslim
terrorist groups and criminal gangs in the region has now reached a mature
stage.[xxxi] It has spawned a transnational criminal network with jihadist
sympathies.[xxxii] That network currently supplies Western Europe with thousands
of smuggled humans (most of them Muslims) and with the bulk of its heroin,
mostly of Afghan origin.[xxxiii]
The growing gap between the reality of Islam in the Balkans and Western
mainstream narrative about its allegedly moderate and tolerant nature is by now
too obvious to remain unchallenged.[xxxiv] A leading Israeli authority on
Islamic movements has summarized the problem succinctly:
In Bosnia it was the revivalist Islamic ideology of Izetbegovic … was aided by
Iran and other Muslim countries, happy to see Islamic politics back in Central
Europe. Then came the Albanian uprising in Kosovo, which duplicated the same
situation and drove the re-Islamization of that land under the support of the
West. The result is that while the Muslims have established a continuity which
drives a wedge within Christian Central Europe, the West is looking with
indifference at that evolving situation which they hope will create a docile
Turkish-like Islam. In view of the trouble Turkey itself is suffering from
Muslim fundamentalists, it is doubtful whether these hopes will be
fulfilled.[xxxv]
Effectively helping “the establishment of a continuity which drives a wedge” in
the heart of Europe has been a key theme of American policy-making in the region
since 1992. The involvement of successive U.S. administrations in the Balkans
illustrates the failed expectation that satisfying Muslim ambitions in a
secondary theater will improve the U.S. standing in the Muslim world as a whole.
The policy has never yielded any dividends, but repeated failure only prompts
its advocates to redouble their efforts.
The problematic legacy of the Bosnian war – not only for the Balkans but for
Europe as a whole and for the rest of the world – will not be resolved without
critical reexamination of Western policies and Western illusions. Appeasing
global jihad, in Bosnia or anywhere else, is morally unsupportable and
counterproductive in countering the existential threat of global terrorism.

[i] Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. Washington DC: Directorate
of Intelligence, 2011.
[ii]See Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate. Praeger, 2007.
[iii] Alija Izetbegoviæ, Islamska deklaracija. Sarajevo: Mala muslimanska
biblioteka, 1990.
[iv] Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray, USA: “Selling the Bosnia Myth to America:
Buyer Beware.” U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS,
October 1995
[v] The region’s once-thriving Jewish community was destroyed during World War
II with the enthusiastic participation of two Muslim Waffen SS divisions, Hanjar
(Bosnian) and Skenderbey (Kosovo-Albanian).
[vi] Videos of such gruesome spectacles are circulated through Islamic centers
and Internet sites in the West.
[vii] 104th Congress, 2nd Session: Final Report of the Select Subcommittee to
Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and
Bosnia. Submitted: October 25, 1996.
[viii] The Washington Post, November 30, 1995.
[ix] “Mujaheddin Remaining in Bosnia,” The Washington Post, July 8, 1996.
[x] The Los Angeles Times, October 7, 2001.
[xi] AP, November 21, 2001. As the Wall Street Journal Online noted on February
8, 2011, Osama Bin Laden received a Bosnian passport from the Bosnian embassy in
Vienna in 1993.
[xii] “Le troisième membre du ‘gang de Roubaix’ se revendique proche du FIS.” Le
Monde, October 6, 2001.
[xiii] L’Express, December 26, 1996. Three months later The Washington Post
confirmed that “the Clinton Administration knew of the activities of Bin Laden’s
so-called Relief Agency, which was, in fact, funneling weapons and money into
Bosnia.”
[xiv] The New York Times, June 26, 1997.
[xv] The Los Angeles Times, October 7, 2001.
[xvi] John Schindler, author of Unholy Terror, in World Magazine, Vol. 22, No.
35, September 27, 2007.
[xvii] Ibid.
[xviii] „US expert believes Osama network active in Bosnia,” AFP, October 25,
2004.
[xix] U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Oregon Press Release of February 17,
2005: “U.S. Branch of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and Two Officers Indicted.“
[xx] Der Spiegel, December 8, 2003.
[xxi] “Foreign Islamists a concern for EU peacekeepers in Bosnia,” AFP, November
29, 2004.
[xxii] “Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant
Islamic Base,” U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, January 16, 1997.
[xxiii] See “Fingerprints: Arms to Bosnia, the real story,” The New Republic,
October 28, 1996.
[xxiv] “U.S. Had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms, Avoid Iran,” The Los Angeles
Times, July 1, 1996.
[xxv] “Iran, Bosnia to Expand Ties.” IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcasting), December 21, 2003.
[xxvi] Sir Alfred Sherman: “Let’s Remove the Blinkers.” The Jewish Chronicle
(London), September 30, 1994.
[xxvii] Shaul Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans. Transaction Publishers,
2008.
[xxviii] John R. Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the Rise of
Global Jihad. Zenith Press, 2007.
[xxix] “Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant
Islamic Base,” U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, January 16, 1997.
[xxx] “Foreign Islamists a concern for EU peacekeepers in Bosnia,” AFP, November
29, 2004.
[xxxi] “Terrorists use Balkan corridor.” International Herald Tribune, April 18,
2006.
[xxxii] Less than a year after NATO intervention, on 10 March 2000, the UN human
rights rapporteur Jiri Dienstbier declared that “Kosovo is in chaos,” having
become “a mafia paradise.” Reuters, 20 March 2000.
[xxxiii] National Criminal Intelligence Service: Western Balkan organised crime
NCIS assessmentNovember 2002; http://www.ncis.co.uk/ukta/2002/threat04.asp>
[xxxiv] “Fissures in Balkan Islam,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 14,
2006.
[xxxv] Raphael Israeli: From Bosnia To Kosovo: The Re-Islamization Of The
Balkans. Ariel Center for Policy Research, Policy Paper No. 109, 2004.
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