Narco …

Make sure you watch this video !!,com_seyret/Itemid,36/task,videodirectlink/id,791/

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) abducted civilians in Kosovo who were then mistreated and in some cases killed, a BBC investigation has found.

By Nick Thorpe
BBC News, Budapest

Cemetery in Kukes

Witnesses say some KLA victims are buried in Kukes cemetery in Albania

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) abducted civilians in Kosovo who were then mistreated and in some cases killed, a BBC investigation has found.

Sources told the BBC that Kosovo Serbs, ethnic Albanians and gypsies were among an estimated 2,000 who went missing.

This took place both during and after the war in Kosovo, which ended in June 1999.

Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, the former KLA political director, has rejected the allegations.

Mr Thaci said he was aware that individuals had „abused KLA uniforms“ after the war, but said the KLA had distanced itself from such acts.

He added that such abuse was „minimal“.


The BBC News investigation also studies claims that some of those held in Albania were killed for their organs, and that physical evidence gathered by UN investigators in Albania was destroyed by the International War Crimes Tribunal.

Crossing Continents, BBC Radio 4 Thursday 9 April, 1100 BST
Newsnight, BBC 2 Thursday 9 April, 2230 BST
Read more: Horrors of KLA prison camps revealed

A former prisoner of the KLA, an ethnic Albanian from Kosovo who was held in a KLA prison in Kukes, northern Albania, agreed to speak to us on condition of anonymity. His family are terrified for his life.

„They ill-treated people in the corridor,“ he says. „They also came into the rooms in groups of five or six to question us. And they used knives, guns, and automatic rifles.“

His testimony confirms that people of different ethnic backgrounds were kept there, including Serbs.

He told the BBC: „When a person is mistreated… he cries out ‚oh mother‘ in his own language.

„The nights were very quiet, so you could hear them crying out… while they were being beaten, or afterwards.“

Sources in Kukes suggest that up to 18 prisoners held at the camp were killed.


Just across the border, in Prizren, in western Kosovo, Brankica Antic lights a candle for her husband Zlatko.

Candles at the Monastery of the Holy Archangel near Prizren, Kosovo

Families light candles in memory of their missing relatives

A Kosovo Serb, she says he was abducted in July 1999 in Prizren by men in KLA uniforms – six weeks after the end of the war, when Nato-led peacekeepers were well established.

At the Monastery of the Holy Archangel near Prizren, candles are lit for loved ones according to the Serbian Orthodox tradition.

Candles are lit either on the top shelf for the living, or the lower, for the dead. Brankica still lights her candles for Zlatko on the top.

„We always light candles for their health and well-being, and we will continue to do so unless and until their bodies are found, and we know for a fact that they are gone,“ she says.

Zlatko is one of about 400 Kosovo Serbs who were abducted at the end of the war, and are still missing, according to Family Associations of the Missing in Serbia.

Around 150 are still missing from the war period.

A further 1,500 Kosovo Albanians are still missing from wartime, when Serb security forces carried out many, well-documented atrocities against the majority Albanian population.

Hundreds of bodies were found in mass graves in Serbia. Our investigation shows that KLA fighters, too, were guilty of serious human rights abuses.

Povratak izbeglica iz Nemačke za Kosovo/Metohiju – zašto se ne vraća niko dobrovoljno ovim „dobrotvorima“!?

Neka otvori crveni krst, karitativne, humanitarne organizacije svoje zabeleške i intervjue prognanih i mučenih izbeglica kojima su pružali pomoć pa će se videti prava tragedija naneta od te terorističke organizacije. Potucam se po Nemačkoj od psihijatara do psihijatra od bolnica, nervnih klinika, od mila do nedraga da bi kao tumač u nemačkoj ublažio nesreću nanetu od ovih zločinaca. Nema narodne pripadnosti koja nije bila pogodjena i koja bi se dobrovoljno vratila na Kosovo/Metohiju. Ne moraju pitati srbe ko je koga proterao, neka pitaju rome bez obzira na njihovu religioznu pripadnost, od koga su pobegli i zbog koga se ne vraćaju na Kosovo. Neće te čuti niti od jednog da se boje vratiti zbog srba, naprotiv. Ako se budu nasilno vraćali onda hoće radje za Srbiju a nikako za Kosvo/Metohiju i pored toga što su u većini albanski muslimani i što znaju bolje govoriti albanski nego srpski. To je realnost na terenu i istina koja je poznata svim nadležnima samo se prave naivni kao da nemaju pojma o pojmu a potrebno je postaviti samo obično pitanje, zašto se ne vraća niko dobrovoljno ovim „dobrotvorima“!?  Niti jedna etnička grupa pa i mnogi albanci neće da se vrate za Kosovo/Metohiju. Svi se oni već sada izjašnjavaju da ako nema druge da ih onda radje proteraju za Srbiju, našta imaju i pravo jer je Kosovo teritorija Srbije !

Dušan Nonković

Kosovo’s affairs & the „Narco-statehood“

Kosovo’s affairs & the „Narco-statehood“

07 Apr 2009
The strongest passion in the world is jealousy, but the sweetest is revenge.

An old Cossack saying

Do not envy a sinner; you don’t know what disaster awaits him.


Kosovo’s independence proclamation by the Albanian secessionist administration in Pristina in February 2008, follows a course that was drafted back in March 1999 when NATO started a war against the then Yugoslavia and more specifically against Serbia, who at that time composed more than 90% of Yugoslavia.

Although a decade has passed and numerous efforts have been made by the international authorities, along with a tremendous cash-flow of aid; Kosovo is viewed as a region that is under the tight grip of organized crime and corruption which spans through he entire social and political sphere.

This article examines the situation in Kosovo in relation to the dependence of the region with drug trafficking.
In Kosovo, the main managers of illicit drugs are the so-called «15 families» which represent the core power of the state, because of their financial clout and political connections. Reports by the German intelligence service in 2005, described the former Prime Minister of Kosovo Ramous Haradinaj as related «in drug trafficking, extortion and protection business».
The German authorities found «The interdependence of the political leadership in Pristina organized crime and the latter’s desire to prevent the formation of a stable political climate, to constantly monitor the government».
Finally the Germans analysts warned for «serious risks from the ongoing corruption in Kosovo in relation to other Balkan countries and the security of the region».

The EU report in 2007, underlines the «inability of local officials to put pressure on criminal organizations and the serious risk of collapse of the social system because of the crime issue». The main reason is «The lack of political will by the leadership», which paradoxically it is fanatically supported by most major European countries.

The German report specifically mentioned the name Niam Behzloulzi, a Kosovo smuggler and number two in the hierarchy of the former UCK, and a possible explosives supplier «In London and Madrid attacks». American journalist John Gizzi confirmed that information and added that «The origin of the ammunition of these terrorist acts was Kosovo».

The Italian newspaper La Republica in a research on the situation in the region, states for the Kosovo criminals, of their ability to fully exploit the lack of «political culture» in the region and affect every key decision over and above the international force which does not control the situation.

The current leadership under Hashim Thaci is to emerge from the unholy alliance of traffickers in the region and the UCK. Michel Koutouzis, an expert analyst on security issues in Paris has long confirmed that the Pristina government has always been « subject to the power of the Mafiosi who were the largest donors of the KLA rebels and want to keep the region in their own sphere of influence».


Serb Demonization as Propaganda Coup Foreign Policy in Focus

Serb Demonization as Propaganda Coup Foreign Policy in Focus ^ | April 6, 2009 | Edward S. Herman Posted on Wednesday, April 08, 2009 7:31:56 PM by Ravnagora The successful demonization of the Serbs, making them largely responsible for the Yugoslav wars, and as unique and genocidal killers, was one of the great propaganda triumphs of our era. It was done so quickly, with such uniformity and uncritical zeal in the mainstream Western media, that disinformation had (and still has, after almost two decades) a field day. The demonization flowed from the gullibility of Western interests and media (and intellectuals). With Yugoslavia no longer useful as an ally after the fall of the Soviet Union, and actually an obstacle as an independent state with a still social democratic bent, the NATO powers aimed at its dismantlement, and they actively supported the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Kosovo Albanians. That these were driven away by Serb actions and threats is untrue: they had their own nationalistic and economic motives for exit, stronger than those of the Serbs. Milosevic’s famous speeches of 1987 and 1989 weren’t nationalistic – despite the lies to the contrary, both speeches called for tolerance of all „nations“ within Yugoslavia. He also never sought a „Greater Serbia,“ but rather tried to maintain a unified Yugoslavia, and when this failed – with the active assistance of the NATO powers – he tried, only fitfully, to allow stranded Serb minorities to stay within Yugoslavia or join Serbia, a matter of obvious „self-determination“ that NATO granted to Kosovo Albanians and everybody but Serbs (for documentation on these points, see this Monthly Review article I co-authored with David Peterson in October, 2007). Biased Reporting Many well-qualified observers of the Bosnia wars were appalled at the biased reporting and gullibility of mainstream journalists, who followed a party line and swallowed anything the Bosnian Muslim (and U.S.) officials told them. The remarkable inflation of claims of Serb evil and violence (and playing down of NATO-clients‘ violence), with fabricated „concentration camps,“ „rape camps,“ and similar Nazi- and Auschwitz-like analogies, caused the onetime head of the U.S. intelligence section in Sarajevo, Lieutenant Colonel John Sray, to state back in 1995 that America has not been so pathetically deceived since Robert McNamara helped to micromanage and escalate the Vietnam War.Popular perceptions pertaining to the Bosnian Muslim government.have been forged by a prolific propaganda machine. A strange combination of three major spin doctors, including public relations (PR) firms in the employ of the Bosniacs, media pundits, and sympathetic elements of the US State Department, have managed to manipulate illusions to further Muslim goals. Numerous others made the same point: Cedric Thornberry, a high UN official who investigated atrocities in Bosnia wrote in Foreign Policy in 1996 that By early 1993 a consensus developed – especially in the United States, but also in some Western European countries and prominently in parts of the international liberal media – that the Serbs were the only villains.This view did not correspond to the perceptions of successive senior UN personnel in touch with daily events..[and one kindly soul at UN headquarters] warned me to take cover – the fix is on. The same point was made by Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie, who insisted that „it was not a black-and-white picture and that ‚bad‘ buys had not killed ‚good‘ guys. The situation was far more complex“ (Globe & Mail, July 15, 2005). The same was said by former NATO Deputy Commander Charles Boyd, former UNPROFOR Commander Satish Nambiar, UN officials Philip Corwin and Carlos Martins Branco, and former U.S. State Department official George Kenney. But anybody who parted from the party line was ignored or marginalized. When George Kenney changed his mind from anti-Serb interventionist to critic, he was quickly dropped by the mainstream media. Journalist Peter Brock, who wrote „Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press,“ in Foreign Policy’s Winter 1993-1994 issue, which documented systematic bias and errors, was viciously attacked and driven into multi-year silence. A reporter like David Binder of The New York Times who refused to adhere to the party-demonization line was soon taken off the beat. An important part of the fix was dishonest demonization, as with the famous August 1992 picture of Fikret Alic, an emaciated prisoner behind barbed wire in a Serb „concentration camp.“ But the UK journalists had pushed forward a man who was sick and quite unrepresentative: the barbed wire was around the journalists, not the camp, and it was a transit camp, not a concentration camp. Western journalists went berserk over these alleged camps, but failed to report the Red Cross finding that „Serbs, Croats, and Muslims all run detention camps and must share equal blame.“ John Burns‘ Pulitzer for 1993 was based heavily on his interview with an alleged Serb killer-rapist, Borislav Herak, who later confessed that after torture he had recited lines forced on him by his Bosnian Muslim captors. The joint Pulitzer winner in 1993 was Roy Gutman, who specialized in hearsay evidence and handouts from Croatian and Bosnian Muslim propaganda sources. Gutman never got around to Croat and Muslim camps. His and other journalists‘ claims about „an archipelago of [Serb] sex-enslavement camps“ were spectacular and wrong – ultimately, there were more credible affidavits of Serb than Bosnian Muslim women rape victims. (For an excellent discussion of the wild news reports versus ascertainable facts, see Chapter Five of Peter Brock’s Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting [GM Books, 2005]). All these journalists portrayed the Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović as a devotee of ethnic tolerance; none ever quoted his Islamic Declaration, which proclaimed that „there is neither peace nor coexistence between the ‚Islamic religion‘ and non-Islamic social and political institutions.“ For an extensive discussion of Izetbegović’s close relations with Iran and commitment to an Islamic state, see John Schindler’s Unholy Terror (Zenith Press, 2007), which I reviewed in Z Magazine. Retaliation Another part of the fix was the failure to pay any attention to crimes that preceded brutal Serb actions. This was frequent, although there certainly were cases where the Serbs (mainly paramilitary forces) struck first. But the tit-for-tat was common and much of it, and many of the mutual fears, were traceable back to the mass murders – disproportionately of Serbs – of World War II, the Nazi occupation, and Croatian fascist Ustasha. This background of truly mass killing was blacked out in the mainstream propaganda system. Most important in recent tit-for-tat was the Srebrenica case, where the background to the Serb behavior in July 1995 was (and remains) ignored. You won’t read in the U.S. press the claim by veteran British journalist Joan Phillips that by March 31, 1993, „out of 9,300 Serbs who used to live (in the Srebrenica municipality), less than 900 remain.only three Serbian villages remain and around 26 have been destroyed.“ („Victims and Villains in Bosnia’s War,“ South Slav Journal, Spring-Summer 1992 – published in 1993). Many more were destroyed after that, and a 1995 Serb monograph entitled The Book of the Dead listed 3,287 Serbs from the Srebrenica region who were killed in the three years before July 1995. Serb forensic expert Dr. Zoran Stankovic and his team uncovered over a thousand Serb bodies in the Srebrenica area well before July 1995, and General Lewis Mackenzie has stated that „evidence to date suggests that he (Naser Oric, a Bosnian Muslim commander in Srebrenica) was responsible for killing as many Serb civilians outside Srebrenica as the Bosnian Serb army was for massacring Bosnian Muslims inside the town.“ Stankovic and the Serb authorities could never get the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or Western media interested in these massacres. A microcosm of the bias of the ICTY can be seen in its treatment of Naser Oric. When a video turned up in 2005 showing an alleged Bosnian Serb execution of six Bosnian Muslims (its provenance and authenticity uncertain), this received widespread and indignant attention in the West, and was alleged to be a „smoking gun“ proving the 8,000 executed at Srebrenica. But there are more clearly authentic videos that Oric showed to Toronto Star journalist Bill Schiller and Washington Post reporter John Pomfret, in which Oric brags about the Serb killings and beheadings displayed for them, and claims to have killed 114 Serbs in just one of these incidents. Pomfret had a single back page article on this, Schiller two, and otherwise silence reigned. Nobody said this was a „smoking gun“ proving that Serb victimization in the Srebrenica area was massive and that the supposed „demilitarization“ of that „safe area“ was a fraud. There was no comment when it took the ICTY till 2002 to indict Oric, charging him not with killing but failure to control his subordinates in six cases, and ultimately throwing out the case on a technicality. The ICTY never took evidence from Schiller or Pomfret, and failed to use the videos they had seen as part of the evidence. The ICTY also failed to take the evidence of Ibran Mustafic, a Bosnian Muslim official in Srebrenica, who in his recent book, Planned Chaos, declares Oric to be „a war criminal without par,“ and describes personally observed gruesome murders by Oric. French General Philippe Morillon, was also not called, although he had testified in the Milosevic trial, claiming that Oric „took no prisoners,“ and that his mass killings from the „safe area“ had been the key factor in explaining Serb vengefulness in their takeover of Srebrenica. The ICTY wasn’t an instrument of justice – it was a faux-judicial arm of NATO, created to service its aims in the Balkan wars, which it did in numerous ways. But a key role was to focus on, demonize, isolate and condemn Serbs, who were the NATO target. Whenever NATO needed a lift, the ICTY was there to help – indicting Karadzic and Mladic explicitly to remove them as negotiators at Dayton; indicting Milosevic in May 1999 just as NATO was starting to draw criticism for its bombing of Serbian civilian facilities (war crimes). For crushing analyses of the ICTY and its role, see Travesty by John Laughland (Pluto Press, 2007) and Michael Mandel’s How America Gets Away with Murder (Pluto Press, 2004). Inflated Killings Inflating Serb killings was institutionalized early in the Yugoslavia conflict, crucially helped by media and liberal-left gullibility. There was huge dependence on Bosnian Muslim and U.S. officials, who lied often, but were never doubted by the press. In the case of the infamous Markale Market massacre on August 27, 1993, timed just before a NATO meeting at which bombing the Serbs was approved, key experts and observers on the scene – UK, French, Canadian, UN, even U.S. – were convinced that this was carried out by the Bosnian Muslims. But this could make no headway in the mainstream media. The Bosnian Muslims claimed 200,000 dead by early 1993 (and of course, exclusively Serb concentration and rape camps) and it was swallowed, along with the alleged drive for a „Greater Serbia.“ The same inflation took place regarding Kosovo both before and after the bombing war, with an alleged pre-war genocide and a more wildly claimed bombing-war genocide (with the State Department estimating as many as 500,000 Kosovo Albanians murdered). These were all big lies. The 200,000 (later, up to 300,000) has shrunk to 100,000, including about 65,000 civilians, on all sides in Bosnia. The prewar Kosovo toll was diminished to some 2,000 in the year before the bombing, a majority of them victims of the KLA rather than the Serbs (according to British Defense Secretary George Robertson), and the body-plus-missing total for Kosovo during the bombing war contracted to some 6,000-7,000 on all sides. But there were neither apologies nor reassessment from the mainstream media or liberal apologists for the „good war.“ They still have Srebrenica. But like the other inflated or untrue elements of the demonization process, they have it by cheating. There’s no doubt that there were executions at Srebrenica, but nothing like 8,000 and very possibly not any more than the number of Serb civilians killed by Naser Oric in the Srebrenica areas, as suggested by General Lewis Mackenzie (who in my opinion was conservative on this point). The morality tale rests heavily on failure to acknowledge that Srebrenica wasn’t a demilitarized „safe area“ but a protected Bosnian Muslim military base that had been used to decimate the local Serb population. It also rests on the failure to see that the massacre was immensely useful, like the Markale Market massacre, with the hope and expectation that it would produce a NATO military response. Bosnian Muslim leaders were crying „genocide“ even before the Serbs captured Srebrenica. It also rests on numbers manipulation. There were only about 2,000 bodies found near Srebrenica after intense searches over the next six years, not all Bosnian Muslims and those that were not necessarily executed. There had been intense fighting outside Srebrenica, but it was convenient for numbers inflation that these deaths could be ignored and any „missing“ could be assumed executed. The idea that the Serbs moved several thousand bodies en masse has never been plausible: Trucking them would have been easily caught by satellite surveillance – no such pictures have been produced – and some of the alleged new graves were closer to Srebrenica than the alleged places of removal. The belated grave findings after the year 2000 have been under the control of the Bosnian Muslim leadership, which has provided disinformation from 1992 on a very consistent basis. Their post-2000 findings and DNA identifications have been further compromised by their very unscientific handling of the body remains (in the ground five or more years), their inability to distinguish between bodies killed in fighting and executed, or those that may have died before or after 1995, and their frequent timing to reinforce political events. The continuous publicity over Srebrenica, like its initial surge, has been hugely political – this selective and inflated victimization has political payoffs for the victims and their patrons, along with psychological rewards in inflicting pain on longstanding enemies and targets. And in this case, the imperial rulers aren’t only able to point to an allegedly justified „humanitarian intervention“ to help cover over their larger plans in a global projection of power, but they have been able to transform the Balkans into a staging ground for NATO’s post-Cold war expansionist order. __________________________ Edward S. Herman, Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, is the author of many books on economics, foreign policy, and the media, including Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (with Philip Hammond, eds., Pluto, 2000). _______

BALKANS: Cluster Bombs Threaten Thousands By Vesna Peric Zimonjic

M….. F…….
BALKANS: Cluster Bombs Threaten Thousands
By Vesna Peric Zimonjic

BELGRADE, Apr 8 (IPS) – An estimated 160,000 people in Serbia are still in danger from thousands of unexploded cluster bombs, ten years after the NATO bombing campaign. The danger is gravest in the south, close to the border with Kosovo.

A survey by the independent Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) says that North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) cluster bombs lie scattered through 15 municipalities in southern Serbia, endangering close to half the population in the region.

Cluster bombs are carried in ‚mother bombs‘ dropped by planes. Those bombs eject clusters of smaller ‚bomblets‘ designed to explode on impact.

NATO carried out a bombing campaign in 1999 to end a Serb onslaught against the ethnic Albanian rebellion in Kosovo. NATO used cluster bombs on army convoys or troop concentrations in Kosovo. But cluster bombs were used randomly as well. The bombing of southern Serbian city Nis in May 1999 left 20 dead and more than 100 wounded.

The failure rate of this weapon, which is up to 15 percent, means that thousands of unexploded bomblets remain underground and lead to death or injuries among civilians for years. The unexploded ammunition needs to be destroyed on the spot by specialists.

„Unexploded cluster bombs remain dug in the soil at 50 to 70 centimetres,“ Miroslav Pisarevic, cluster bomb expert and researcher at the NPA project told IPS. „They are in the fields, that people cannot use any more. Thus they are a universal safety and development threat.“

International efforts to ban cluster bombs have led to creation of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), which is lobbying for a ban of such weapons. An international convention to ban cluster bombs has been signed so far by 94 states. The convention will come into force globally six months after 30 states ratify it.

So far, six states have ratified the convention – Austria, the Holy See, Ireland, Laos, Norway and Sierra Leone. Ratification by 30 countries is needed for the convention to become international law. It will then hold for the ratifying states.

Major weapons producers such as the United States, Russia and China have not signed the convention. Serbia was one of the countries that joined the efforts for a ban on cluster weapons, but it refrained from signing the international document without any explanation.

Two years ago, Serbia was among the most active states in supporting international efforts to ban cluster ammunition. But it stayed away from a meeting in Dublin last December when the final text of the convention was adopted.

No Serbian official is willing to comment on the U-turn. Officials at the ministry of foreign affairs say their ministry supports a ban, but that the decision lies with the ministry of defence and the Council for National Security. Ministry of defence officials decline comment.

A strong military lobby is still active in Serbia, and the country has large stockpiles of cluster ammunition, produced for decades in the country and used in the wars of the 1990s.

That does not ease the problem of the cluster bombs dropped by NATO. The NPA survey says Serbia needs about 38 million dollars to unearth and defuse unexploded cluster ordnance.

„We, the victims, represent the real face of this weapon,“ Dejan Dikic, Serbian activist from Ban Advocates told IPS. „It is a shame of civilisation…when we speak to diplomats about the ban issue, most of them have enough honesty not to look us into the eyes.“ [Hello Clinton! Hello Canada!!!] Ban Advocates is an organisation that brings together people from diverse cluster munitions affected communities. Dikic is one of the victims of the 1999 NATO bombing of Nis.

„I am disgusted by the attitude of my government,“ Dikic said. „I can’t understand it. Serbia was a leader in the process, especially on victim assistance.“

„There is no country I’m more disappointed with than Serbia,“ Thomas Nash, global coordinator of the Cluster Munition Coalition told IPS. „The government owes it to its people to join the convention and obtain the necessary funds for further clearance of unexploded cluster bombs.“

According to official NATO information provided to Serbia in 2007, 1,080 cluster bombs were dropped on 219 locations in Serbia proper, and 1,392 bombs (with 289,536 bomblets) were dropped on 333 sites in Kosovo. (END/2009)

Petition – Abschluss