Село Костреш код Дервенте СТРАДАЊЕ И ЗБИЈЕГОВИ

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Село Костреш код Дервенте

СТРАДАЊЕ И ЗБИЈЕГОВИ

Мало село Костреш општина Дервента налази се сјеверно од града Дервенте,на узвишењу од око 200 метара надморске висине са благом падином јужно према ријеци Укрини и сјеверно премеа ријеци Сави.Од града је удаљено пет километра,а од ријеке Саве до границе са државом Хравтском нешто више од три километра.

Насеље Костреш као топоним је веома интресантно. Мјештани не сјећају и не знају како је дошло до овог назива љиховог села.Могло би се рећи да је назив села Костреш пороизашао из онога што га је кроз настанак и времена сналазило,то јест најближе су му ријечи настанка страх или кошмар.А страхове и кошмаре ово је село памтило од када постоји.

Село карактеришу плодне њиве,које су већ у првим јутарњим сунчевим зрацима обасјане,па су мјештани надалеко познати по производњи раног поврћа.Захваљујући таквим условима и положају ово село је одувијек имало богата домаћинства,добре баштоване,воћаре и произвођаче житарица.

Ипак,такав положај,на узвишењу са кога се на сјеверу види ријека Сава и преко Славонија као на длану ,а јужно град Дервента са укринском долином и западно планина Мотајица,увијек је одређивао,рекло би се, и злу судбину овог малог села,не зато што је мало,него што му ратови и сукоби, кошмари и страхови, бјежаније и збијегови који су се као црни облак, чим нешта не иде како треба надвијали над овим селом и зато није никада могло да буде велико и да “одрасте“. Село је одувијек било настањено православним српским живљем, а граничило је са селима гдје су настањени Хрвати.

Ово све ће селу давати посебан печат који ће кројити његову судбину кроз настајање постојање, страдање, успињање и поново падање све до дубоких понора и понижења , уништења и протјеривања. Сукобљене снаге су се одувијек бориле за узвшење звано Костреш јер са тога мјеста, могу да контролишу читаву велики дио насеља уз град Дервенту и на сјеверу Саву и Славонију,а надомак је планина Мотајица,која је веома значајан стратешки географски и војни објекат.

Када би год настао мир ,сви су наизглед, живјели сложно и помагали једне друге.Чим би настао сукоб и рат, онда је село Костреш постајало мета напада својих комшија који су их протјеривали са њихових огњишта, а они су се увијек успјели вратити и опоравити.

Оне 1941.године, снађе село зла коб, већина их изгину и би убијена на кућном прагу, а опет други настрадаше по логорима Јасеновца, Славонске Пожеге. Након рата успјели су да се обнове, да наследнике и дјецу жене и удају,унуке хране, а оно опет рат, нови погром, проганства од комшија, рушења кућа и уништења свега што је српско на Кострешу.У неповрат су само за трен отишла сва материјална добра вриједних Кострешана ,срушена је црква која је направљена крајем 19.вијека и четворогодишња школа.

И опет 1992.године, Кострешани у априлу морају у збијег.Неки нису могли ни побјећи јер их стигла судбина њихових дједова и прадједова “усташка кама“ и метак у главу од “добрих“ комшија Хрвата, који се нису стидјели да се називају усташама.Кренула је колона Кострешана у неизвијесност само са пар крпица и дроња у рукама.Нису смјели узети ни деку , јорган, одијело,трактор, ауто, камионе, једноставно су добили наређење да одлазе куд знају и умију без игдје ичега.Ко није послушао није имао још једну шансу да остане жив,негдје на другом мјесту.А и ужаси и звјерства која су начињена остаће запамћена по силовањима, убијањима старих и изнемоглих и то заједно комшије, Хрвати и војска из Хрватске.

На овој фотографији је забиљежен збијег у Кострешу. То је доказ који је забиљежио злочин над њима, кад нису знали куда ће ни шта ће. Пред силом се морало усткунуту и попустити.Такво понижење нису очекивали. Као бескућници, морали су на далеки пут, који ће их некада ипак поново вратити у њихово село.Тад ће неко од њих пронаћи ову фотографију и бити изненађен да су своја злодјела забиљежили на фотографији.

Тако ће ова слика с фотографије једног непознатог припадника ХВО или ЗНГ постати икона Кострешана о праштању, али не и заборављању.

По ослобођењу 1992. године у Кострешу није било ни једне читаве куће. Све је било порушено, камен на камену,цигла на цигли.Мирис паљевине се дуго осјећао.Село је ослобођено у августу 1992.године и дуго је зјапило пусто.Понеко је у њега навраћао ,али се није дуго задржавао.Обнова почиње нешто интензивније крајем 1996. године,углавном снажном жељом мјештана да се врате на своје огњиште.Није изостала помоћ општине ,хуманитарних организација. Највише им је помогла влада краљевине Норвешке.Тако се Костреш уз потешкоће вратио себи са својим становницима,у нади да више никада неће бити рушења,прогона и страдања.

У том малом селу Костреш,гдје је крајем 1995.године био само камен на камену,гдје су многи мислили да се живот више никада за много година неће започети и вратити,сада су направљене и поправљене куће,основана имања и Кострешани се враћају још увијек и не дају се, јер како каже један од мјештана Андрија Стринић :“Били смо понижени,али смо на крају и поред многобројних жртава, уништења материјалних добара остали морални побједници“.

Дванест српских душа у једном дану ,4.априла 1992.године, су поклани или побијени код својих кућа у Кострешу: Секулић(Ђорђе)Миле,Секулић(Тривуна) Љепосава,Лазић (Миле ) Ђорђо,Лазић (Божо) Петра,Шкрга (Недо)Миле,Плавшић (Теодора) Стоја, Пиваш(Раде)Ристо, Пиваш Десанка, Митровић(Мирко)Петра,Шкрга (Илије) Анђа,Тривунчевић(Косте) Госпава и Милојевић (Милован) Симо.

Они нису хтјели са свога прага или нису успјели побјећи.То нису једине жртве,помињемо само оне који су у једном дану убијени и поклани.

Тад и у то вријеме рат се није био разбукатао у БиХ,а Срби су још очекивали мир,али други нису тако мислили.Несматано су прелазили преко Саве,пребацивали војну опрему,муницију, оружје и тешко наоружање.“Пси рата“ су већ почеткм пролећа 1992.године, почели узимати данак у крви.Покољ у Сијековцу код Босанског Брода, па Костреш, јели требало даље чекати нечији одговор,па није чудо што су из ових мјеста Срби панично пошли у да спасе своје животе, не знајући ни једног момента хоће ли свој живот замијенити за смрт?

Исто тако остаје стално једно питање без одговора,ко је био окупатор и злочинац,нажалост многи документи говоре много другчије од оног што нам се приписује.

kostres-2002kostres-stradanje-i-zbijegovi

Povodom intervjua Američkog Ambasadora Mantera Politiki Online

Svakog stranog ambasadora u Ameriki koji bi se toliko mešao u unutrašnje poslove Amerike, Amerika bi ga bez pogovora izbacila odnosno zahtevala da napusti zemlju u roku 24h.
Ja smatram sebe za miroljubivog čoveka, neprekosnovanog pristalicu pravde i istinske demokratije ali da imam vlast taj Manter bi u roku od 24h pakovao svoje kofere ili za Ameriku ili što je još verovatnije, za jedan od zatvora na Balkanu zbog mešanja u unutračnje stvari države Srbije. Pravda nema nikakve veze sa veličinom i silom jedne zemlje. Pravda je obavezujući faktor za sve bez obzira na silu i veličinu!

Dušan Nonković-urednik Glasa Dijaspotre

Serb Demonization as Propaganda Coup

Serb Demonization as Propaganda Coup

Edward S. Herman | April 6, 2009

Serb Demonization as Propaganda Coup

The successful demonization of the Serbs, making them largely responsible for the Yugoslav wars, and as unique and genocidal killers, was one of the great propaganda triumphs of our era. It was done so quickly, with such uniformity and uncritical zeal in the mainstream Western media, that disinformation had (and still has, after almost two decades) a field day.

The demonization flowed from the gullibility of Western interests and media (and intellectuals). With Yugoslavia no longer useful as an ally after the fall of the Soviet Union, and actually an obstacle as an independent state with a still social democratic bent, the NATO powers aimed at its dismantlement, and they actively supported the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Kosovo Albanians. That these were driven away by Serb actions and threats is untrue: they had their own nationalistic and economic motives for exit, stronger than those of the Serbs.

Milosevic’s famous speeches of 1987 and 1989 weren’t nationalistic — despite the lies to the contrary, both speeches called for tolerance of all „nations“ within Yugoslavia. He also never sought a „Greater Serbia,“ but rather tried to maintain a unified Yugoslavia, and when this fail ed — with the active assistance of the NATO powers — he tried, only fitfully, to allow stranded Serb minorities to stay within Yugoslavia or join Serbia, a matter of obvious „self-determination“ that NATO granted to Kosovo Albanians and everybody but Serbs (for documentation on these points, see this Monthly Review article I co-authored with David Peterson in October, 2007).
Biased Reporting

Many well-qualified observers of the Bosnia wars were appalled at the biased reporting and gullibility of mainstream journalists, who followed a party line and swallowed anything the Bosnian Muslim (and U.S.) officials told them. The remarkable inflation of claims of Serb evil and violence (and playing down of NATO-clients‘ violence), with fabricated „concentration camps,“ „rape camps,“ and similar Nazi- and Auschwitz-like analogies, caused the onetime head of the U.S. intelligence section in Sarajevo, Lieutenant Colonel John Sray, to state back in 1995 that

America has not been so pathetically deceived since Robert McNamara helped to micromanage and escalate the Vietnam War…Popular perceptions pertaining to the Bosnian Muslim government…have been forged by a prolific propaganda machine. A strange combination of three major spin doctors, including public relations (PR) firms in the employ of the Bosniacs, media pundits, and sympathetic elements of the US State Department, have managed to manipulate illusions to further Muslim goals.

Numerous others made the same point: Cedric Thornberry, a high UN official who=2 0investigated atrocities in Bosnia wrote in Foreign Policy in 1996 that

By early 1993 a consensus developed — especially in the United States, but also in some Western European countries and prominently in parts of the international liberal media — that the Serbs were the only villains…This view did not correspond to the perceptions of successive senior UN personnel in touch with daily events..[and one kindly soul at UN headquarters] warned me to take cover — the fix is on.

The same point was made by Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie, who insisted that „it was not a black-and-white picture and that ‚bad‘ buys had not killed ‚good‘ guys. The situation was far more complex“ (Globe & Mail, July 15, 2005). The same was said by former NATO Deputy Commander Charles Boyd, former UNPROFOR Commander Satish Nambiar, UN officials Philip Corwin and Carlos Martins Branco, and former U.S. State Department official George Kenney. But anybody who parted from the party line was ignored or marginalized.

When George Kenney changed his mind from anti-Serb interventionist to critic, he was quickly dropped by the mainstream media. Journalist Peter Brock, who wrote „Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press,“ in Foreign Policy’s Winter 1993-1994 issue, which documented systematic bias and errors, was viciously attacked and driven into multi-year silence. A reporter like David Binder of The New York Times who refused to adhere to the party-demonization line was soon taken off the beat.

An impo rtant part of the fix was dishonest demonization, as with the famous August 1992 picture of Fikret Alic, an emaciated prisoner behind barbed wire in a Serb „concentration camp.“ But the UK journalists had pushed forward a man who was sick and quite unrepresentative: the barbed wire was around the journalists, not the camp, and it was a transit camp, not a concentration camp. Western journalists went berserk over these alleged camps, but failed to report the Red Cross finding that „Serbs, Croats, and Muslims all run detention camps and must share equal blame.“ John Burns‘ Pulitzer for 1993 was based heavily on his interview with an alleged Serb killer-rapist, Borislav Herak, who later confessed that after torture he had recited lines forced on him by his Bosnian Muslim captors.

The joint Pulitzer winner in 1993 was Roy Gutman, who specialized in hearsay evidence and handouts from Croatian and Bosnian Muslim propaganda sources. Gutman never got around to Croat and Muslim camps. His and other journalists‘ claims about „an archipelago of [Serb] sex-enslavement camps“ were spectacular and wrong — ultimately, there were more credible affidavits of Serb than Bosnian Muslim women rape victims. (For an excellent discussion of the wild news reports versus ascertainable facts, see Chapter Five of Peter Brock’s Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting [GM Books, 2005]). All these journalists portrayed the Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović as a devotee of ethnic tolerance; none ever quoted his Islamic Declaration, which proclaimed that „there is neither peace nor coexistence between the ‚Islamic religion‘ and non-Islamic social and political institutions.“ For an extensive discussion of Izetbegović’s close relations with Iran and commitment to an Islamic state, see John Schindler’s Unholy Terror (Zenith Press, 2007), which I reviewed in Z Magazine.

Retaliation

Another part of the fix was the failure to pay any attention to crimes that preceded brutal Serb actions. This was frequent, although there certainly were cases where the Serbs (mainly paramilitary forces) struck first. But the tit-for-tat was common and much of it, and many of the mutual fears, were traceable back to the mass murders — disproportionately of Serbs — of World War II, the Nazi occupation, and Croatian fascist Ustasha. This background of truly mass killing was blacked out in the mainstream propaganda system.

Most important in recent tit-for-tat was the Srebrenica case, where the background to the Serb behavior in July 1995 was (and remains) ignored. You won’t read in the U.S. press the claim by veteran British journalist Joan Phillips that by March 31, 1993, „out of 9,300 Serbs who used to live (in the Srebrenica municipality), less than 900 remain…only three Serbian villages remain and around 26 have been destroyed.“ („Victims and Villains in Bosnia’s War,“ South Slav Journal, Spring-Summer 1992 — published in 1993). Many more were destroyed after that, and a 1995 Serb monograph entitled The Book of the Dead listed 3,287 Serbs from the Srebrenica region who were killed in the three years before July 1995. Serb forensic expert Dr. Zoran Stankovic and his team uncovered over a thousand Serb bodies in the Srebrenica area well before July 1995, and General Lewis Mackenzie has stated that „evidence to date suggests that he (Naser Oric, a Bosnian Muslim commander in Srebrenica) was responsible for killing as many Serb civilians outside Srebrenica as the Bosnian Serb army was for massacring Bosnian Muslims inside the town.“ Stankovic and the Serb authorities could never get the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or Western media interested in these massacres.

A microcosm of the bias of the ICTY can be seen in its treatment of Naser Oric. When a video turned up in 2005 showing an alleged Bosnian Serb execution of six Bosnian Muslims (its provenance and authenticity uncertain), this received widespread and indignant attention in the West, and was alleged to be a „smoking gun“ proving the 8,000 executed at Srebrenica. But there are more clearly authentic videos that Oric showed to Toronto Star journalist Bill Schiller and Washington Post reporter John Pomfret, in which Oric brags about the Serb killings and beheadings displayed for them, and claims to have killed 114 Serbs in just one of these incidents. Pomfret had a single back page article on this, Schiller two, and otherwise silence reigned. Nobody said this was a „smoking gun“ proving that Serb victimization in the Srebrenica area was massive and that the sup posed „demilitarization“ of that „safe area“ was a fraud. There was no comment when it took the ICTY till 2002 to indict Oric, charging him not with killing but failure to control his subordinates in six cases, and ultimately throwing out the case on a technicality. The ICTY never took evidence from Schiller or Pomfret, and failed to use the videos they had seen as part of the evidence.

The ICTY also failed to take the evidence of Ibran Mustafic, a Bosnian Muslim official in Srebrenica, who in his recent book, Planned Chaos, declares Oric to be „a war criminal without par,“ and describes personally observed gruesome murders by Oric. French General Philippe Morillon, was also not called, although he had testified in the Milosevic trial, claiming that Oric „took no prisoners,“ and that his mass killings from the „safe area“ had been the key factor in explaining Serb vengefulness in their takeover of Srebrenica.

The ICTY wasn’t an instrument of justice — it was a faux-judicial arm of NATO, created to service its aims in the Balkan wars, which it did in numerous ways. But a key role was to focus on, demonize, isolate and condemn Serbs, who were the NATO target. Whenever NATO needed a lift, the ICTY was there to help — indicting Karadzic and Mladic explicitly to remove them as negotiators at Dayton; indicting Milosevic in May 1999 just as NATO was starting to draw criticism for its bombing of Serbian civilian facilities (war crimes). For crushing analyses of the ICTY and its role, see Travesty by John Laughland (Pluto Press, 2007) and Michael Mandel’s How America Gets Away with Murder (Pluto Press, 2004).

Inflated Killings

Inflating Serb killings was institutionalized early in the Yugoslavia conflict, crucially helped by media and liberal-left gullibility. There was huge dependence on Bosnian Muslim and U.S. officials, who lied often, but were never doubted by the press. In the case of the infamous Markale Market massacre on August 27, 1993, timed just before a NATO meeting at which bombing the Serbs was approved, key experts and observers on the scene — UK, French, Canadian, UN, even U.S. — were convinced that this was carried out by the Bosnian Muslims. But this could make no headway in the mainstream media. The Bosnian Muslims claimed 200,000 dead by early 1993 (and of course, exclusively Serb concentration and rape camps) and it was swallowed, along with the alleged drive for a „Greater Serbia.“

The same inflation took place regarding Kosovo both before and after the bombing war, with an alleged pre-war genocide and a more wildly claimed bombing-war genocide (with the State Department estimating as many as 500,000 Kosovo Albanians murdered). These were all big lies. The 200,000 (later, up to 300,000) has shrunk to 100,000, including about 65,000 civilians, on all sides in Bosnia. The prewar Kosovo toll was diminished to some 2,000 in the year before the bombing, a majority of them victims of the KLA rather than the Serbs (according to British Defense Secretary George Robertson), and the body-plus-missing total for Kosovo during the bombing war contracted to some 6,000-7,000 on all sides. But there were neither apologies nor reassessment from the mainstream media or liberal apologists for the „good war.“

They still have Srebrenica. But like the other inflated or untrue elements of the demonization process, they have it by cheating. There’s no doubt that there were executions at Srebrenica, but nothing like 8,000 and very possibly not any more than the number of Serb civilians killed by Naser Oric in the Srebrenica areas, as suggested by General Lewis Mackenzie (who in my opinion was conservative on this point). The morality tale rests heavily on failure to acknowledge that Srebrenica wasn’t a demilitarized „safe area“ but a protected Bosnian Muslim military base that had been used to decimate the local Serb population. It also rests on the failure to see that the massacre was immensely useful, like the Markale Market massacre, with the hope and expectation that it would produce a NATO military response. Bosnian Muslim leaders were crying „genocide“ even before the Serbs captured Srebrenica.

It also rests on numbers manipulation. There were only about 2,000 bodies found near Srebrenica after intense searches over the next six years, not all Bosnian Muslims and those that were not necessarily executed. There had been intense fighting outside Srebrenica, but it was convenient for numbers inflation that these deaths could be ignored and any „missing“ could be as sumed executed.

The idea that the Serbs moved several thousand bodies en masse has never been plausible: Trucking them would have been easily caught by satellite surveillance — no such pictures have been produced — and some of the alleged new graves were closer to Srebrenica than the alleged places of removal. The belated grave findings after the year 2000 have been under the control of the Bosnian Muslim leadership, which has provided disinformation from 1992 on a very consistent basis. Their post-2000 findings and DNA identifications have been further compromised by their very unscientific handling of the body remains (in the ground five or more years), their inability to distinguish between bodies killed in fighting and executed, or those that may have died before or after 1995, and their frequent timing to reinforce political events.

The continuous publicity over Srebrenica, like its initial surge, has been hugely political — this selective and inflated victimization has political payoffs for the victims and their patrons, along with psychological rewards in inflicting pain on longstanding enemies and targets. And in this case, the imperial rulers aren’t only able to point to an allegedly justified „humanitarian intervention“ to help cover over their larger plans in a global projection of power, but they have been able to transform the Balkans into a staging ground for NATO’s post-Cold war expansionist order.

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5973

Europe’s largest prehistoric culture, the Vinča culture, was born in the greater Belgrade area:

Subject: The Vinča culture
Here’s what I have….

Europe’s largest prehistoric culture, the Vinča culture, was born in the greater Belgrade area:

Thank you.

Grčka Musika – Greeco Music ! Dostavio, Mile Nikolić

http://www.e-radio.gr/

Kosovo’s affairs & the „Narco-statehood“

Kosovo’s affairs & the „Narco-statehood“

http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=2872

Ioannis Michaletos
07 Apr 2009
The strongest passion in the world is jealousy, but the sweetest is revenge.

An old Cossack saying

Do not envy a sinner; you don’t know what disaster awaits him.

Bible

Kosovo’s independence proclamation by the Albanian secessionist administration in Pristina in February 2008, follows a course that was drafted back in March 1999 when NATO started a war against the then Yugoslavia and more specifically against Serbia, who at that time composed more than 90% of Yugoslavia.

Although a decade has passed and numerous efforts have been made by the international authorities, along with a tremendous cash-flow of aid; Kosovo is viewed as a region that is under the tight grip of organized crime and corruption which spans through he entire social and political sphere.

This article examines the situation in Kosovo in relation to the dependence of the region with drug trafficking.
In Kosovo, the main managers of illicit drugs are the so-called «15 families» which represent the core power of the state, because of their financial clout and political connections. Reports by the German intelligence service in 2005, described the former Prime Minister of Kosovo Ramous Haradinaj as related «in drug trafficking, extortion and protection business».
The German authorities found «The interdependence of the political leadership in Pristina organized crime and the latter’s desire to prevent the formation of a stable political climate, to constantly monitor the government».
Finally the Germans analysts warned for «serious risks from the ongoing corruption in Kosovo in relation to other Balkan countries and the security of the region».

The EU report in 2007, underlines the «inability of local officials to put pressure on criminal organizations and the serious risk of collapse of the social system because of the crime issue». The main reason is «The lack of political will by the leadership», which paradoxically it is fanatically supported by most major European countries.

The German report specifically mentioned the name Niam Behzloulzi, a Kosovo smuggler and number two in the hierarchy of the former UCK, and a possible explosives supplier «In London and Madrid attacks». American journalist John Gizzi confirmed that information and added that «The origin of the ammunition of these terrorist acts was Kosovo».

The Italian newspaper La Republica in a research on the situation in the region, states for the Kosovo criminals, of their ability to fully exploit the lack of «political culture» in the region and affect every key decision over and above the international force which does not control the situation.

The current leadership under Hashim Thaci is to emerge from the unholy alliance of traffickers in the region and the UCK. Michel Koutouzis, an expert analyst on security issues in Paris has long confirmed that the Pristina government has always been « subject to the power of the Mafiosi who were the largest donors of the KLA rebels and want to keep the region in their own sphere of influence».

Continue: http://www.serbianna.com/columns/michaletos/046.shtml

Apr 07. 009. Izveštaj sa predavanja – “Nova energetska istraživanja u svetu

Apr 07 Sa predavanja – “Nova energetska istraživanja u svetu – novi izvori energije kao doprinos svetkom miru i očuvanju životne sredine” Uncategorized Add comments Bila mi je čast da budem pozvan i prisustvujem predavanju na Fakultetu Tehničkih nauka u Novom Sadu koje se održalo danas u 17. časova. Glavne teme su bile Samogrejna Ekološka Kuća i Dvostepeni Mehanički Oscilator, a predavač naš istaknuti pronalazač, akademik Veljko Milković. Iako sam tamo bio prvenstveno zbog lične želje da čujem i upoznam gospodina Milkovića, uspeo sam da napravim par fotografija i tako pokušam da prenesem deo izuzetne atmosfere koja je vladala. U prvom delu predavanja pričalo se o samogrejnoj ekološkoj kući, objašnjavan je sam koncept i ideja iza ovakvog projekta za prisutne koji nisu upoznati sa njime. Pokazano je par snimaka među kojima i snimak jedne takve postojeće kuće i izjave njenog zadovoljnog vlasnika, i spomenuto par novih, poboljšanih rešenja. Drugi deo predavanja je bio posvećen Dvostepenom Mehaničkom Oscilatoru i planovima za bolje izučavanje ovog fenomena. Nažalost, finansiranje izgradnje preciznijih modela kao i potreba za specifičnim mernim urešajima je veliki problem tako da se stvari relativno sporo dešavaju. S druge strane, vlada veliko interesovanje kod ljudi u inostranstvu koji imaju veće finansijske mogućnosti, a i želju da doprinesu izučavanju, pa se već prave napredniji modeli kod kojih se, na primer, oscilacija klatna solenoidima konstantno održava. Generalno govoreći, najveći je problem merenje utrošene energije za održavanje klatna u stanju kretanja kao i merenje dobijenog rada/energije na izlazu. Kada bi ovaj problem bio prevaziđen mogli bi smo konačno znati o kom procentu efikasnosti se radi i dali je, kako se nadamo i priželjkujemo, veći od 100%. Eto, našao sam se i u ulozi reportera :) koju sam, nadam se koliko toliko zadovoljavajuće obavio!